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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR
AGREEMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE
SPORTS INDUSTRY
JOHN C. WEISTART*
Much of the recent legal controversy in the professional sports industry has
emanated from the clubs' efforts to limit the movement of players among teams.
The traditional restraints have included devices such as the draft system, reserve
and option clauses, and arrangements requiring that compensation be paid to a
club whose player has accepted employment with another member of the same
league.' Until the early 1970s, these player restraints were treated as matters of
private contract between club and player. Except for occasional decisions inter-
preting the breadth of the club's claim or clarifying the mechanism for a club's
unilateral renewal of a contract, 2 the judiciary played no significant role in over-
seeing the operation of the restraint system. The treatment of the restraints as a
private law matter changed dramatically in the mid-1970s. The advent of durable
players' unions and the commencement of a series of antitrust challenges inter-
jected the law's institutions, especially the courts, rather deeply into the issue of
player mobility. 3 The beneficial effect of these cases was to open the way for
greater player input, typically through collective bargaining, into the shaping of
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1. The present article does not undertake a detailed description of the operation of the various
restraints on mobility. Such discussions can be found elsewhere. See, e.g., J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF SPORTS 500-24 (1979); Lee, A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control Mechanzims Under Antitrust
and Labor Law Principles: Peace at Last, 11 VAL. U.L. REV. 373 (1977); Comment, Antitrust and Professional
Sport: Does Anyone Play by the Rules of the Game?, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 403 (1973); Comment, Player Control
Mechanisms in.Professional Team Sports, 34 U. PrrT. L. REV. 645 (1973). See also H. DEMMERT, THE EcO-
NOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 20-23, 32-39 (1973); Comment, The Super Bowl and the Sherman
Act: Professional Team Sports and the Anttrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 418 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970); Dallas Cowboys Football
Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
3. The present discussion is most germane to the owner-player relationships that exist in the profes-
sional football, basketball, and hockey leagues. The pertinent cases began as antitrust attacks upon the
traditional player restraints in these leagues. Because baseball enjoys a general exemption from the anti-
trust laws, the player control mechanisms in baseball, especially the reserve clause, are not directly affected
by the principles considered here. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aJfd, 443
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aj'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Although there have been significant changes in the
restraint system used in baseball, these changes have resulted from developments outside the antitrust
sphere, such as an arbitrator's interpretation of the standard player contract and a subsequent collective
bargaining agreement. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409
F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.), afd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League
of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n (Messersmith-McNally Arbitration),
66 Lab. Arb. 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.). While labor law principles and the institution of collective bar,
gaining have also been important in defining the restraints that presently exist in sports other than base-
ball, the labor issues in these settings are, as is discerned later, entwined with antitrust concerns which have
not affected the baseball industry.
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these important employment terms. The player restraint cases do, however, leave
some residual concerns about the role of the courts in overseeing the collective
bargaining process. The issues were not presented to the courts as matters of pure
labor law. Antitrust policies were early implicated and later proceedings involved
issues relating to the settlement of class actions. Both of these areas tolerate a
higher degree of judicial involvement in the adjustment of private agreements
than do the labor laws. One of the issues which lingers after the sports cases is
whether the courts have reached the proper accommodation between the com-
peting policies on judicial review. This article undertakes to trace the develop-
ment of the player restraint litigation and to suggest several respects in which
greater deference to established labor policies will have a clarifying influence in
the future.
I
THE THRESHOLD FOR THE LABOR EXEMPTION
With one exception, the antitrust suits challenging the traditional player
restraints were brought by professional athletes who asserted that the limitations
on player mobility artificially restricted competition among employers for the ath-
letes' services. 4 The preliminary rulings in these cases showed that the courts were
definitely inclined to find significant antitrust problems. 5 But before reaching the
substantive antitrust issues, the courts in each case were confronted with the argu-
ment by the defendant clubs that the exemption afforded agreements reached in
collective bargaining removed the disputed restraints from antitrust scrutiny. The
leagues could each point to the fact that their players were unionized and suggest
that the rules in question either had been or could be considered at the bargaining
table. These contentions were rejected for a variety of reasons in the first several
cases to arise. 6 Only later after the antitrust litigation had neutralized the original
restraints, did cases arise in which courts found sufficient bargaining to warrant
immunity.7
The background for these claims of immunity lies in the early efforts of unions
to avoid having their collective activities treated as illegal restraints of trade under
the Sherman Act.8 Although there was a period in which the treatment of the
4. The exception was Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), in which a rival league complained that the NHL's restraints operated
improperly to limit the plaintiffs access to playing talent.
5. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), ajdinpart, rev'dinpart, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.), modifed, 1975-2 Trade Cas. $ 60,448 (S.D.N.Y.);
Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.D.C. 1976), afd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aft'don other grounds, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), afd in part, rev'd in part, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 1975-2 Trade Cas.
60,448 (S.D.N.Y.); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
7. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'g 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.p.
Mich. 1978). See also Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F. 2d 280, 288 (8th Cir. 1978).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932)
(amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976)); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws,
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union's traditional economic tools was in doubt, it was gradually accepted that
labor policy must be accommodated under the antitrust laws. The need for an
adjustment is suggested by a variety of concerns. As an initial matter, there
appears to be a fundamental conflict between the goals of the antitrust laws and
the desire of employees to engage in collective activity. 9 In fact, the employees'
basic economic weapons-strikes, pickets, and boycotts--do restrain trade. More-
over, collective bargaining terms on a variety of issues, including seniority, stan-
dard wage rates, and even hours of work, typically represent a union's effort to
reduce competition among employees. Since both economic coercion and stand-
ardization of employment terms through collective bargaining are protected labor
activities, the concern for unrestrained competition in commercial markets cannot
be extended with full force to the labor sphere.' 0
Another concern of equal import flows from the particular regime for regu-
lating collective bargaining which was built into our basic labor law scheme. The
mechanisms for furthering bargaining were the protection of the right to organize
and the imposition on the employer of a duty to bargain." Except at the
extremes, the system makes no assumption about what the terms of the final bar-
gain should be and there is no vehicle for judicial or administrative oversight to
insure that the terms agreed to are reasonable.' 2 The full implementation of this
labor policy of unrestrained bargaining requires that the availability of review
under other laws, including the antitrust laws, be carefully evaluated and limited
where necessary.'
3
None of the several Supreme Court precedents dealing with the labor exemp-
tion involve situations in which an employer was attempting to assert the exemp-
tions against claims raised by employees, and thus do not directly address the
critical issues raised in the sports cases. 14 The Supreme Court's decisions do, how-
ever, serve to underscore that the availability of the exemption is greatly influ-
enced by the question of whom the disputed practice affects. A bargaining
relationship which covers an entire market raises the prospect of union-manage-
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competitin: The Applicatobn of Antirust Stan-
dards to Union Activiths, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
See also St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 604 (1976).
10. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 562-63 (1979).
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.
1965).
12. SeeH.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents'Int'l Union,
361 U.S. 477, 487-90 (1960); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959). See also
H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 49-125 (1968): Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in
Collective Biarganing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 196-98 (1980); Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467 (1964).
13. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 556-65 (1979).
14. The typical fact setting in which the labor exemption is tested occurs when a union attempts to
raise the exemption defense. The defense may be asserted in an antitrust action brought by an employer
whose employees are represented by the union, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676 (1965), by a third party who alleges that its market activities are restrained, Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), or by the government, United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941). Where third parties' actions are involved, the employer may seek to join the union in claiming the
protection of the exemption.
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ment collusion to control the entry of competitors and, ultimatelty, the price at
which goods are sold. One of the teachings of the Supreme Court's treatment of
the exemption question is that agreements which restrain third parties are suspect,
and in their boldest forms will be found to be beyond the scope of the exemption.'
5
Qualitatively different, however, are the cases in which the agreed-upon restraint
affects only the parties who participated in the bargaining relationship which pro-
duced it.16 At this point, concerns for conspiracy and collusion fade, and concern
for encouraging robust bargaining predominates. Since the labor laws have the
promotion of collective bargaining as a primary goal, and since present labor
policy posits that such bargaining is best promoted by a minimum of judicial over-
sight of the substantive terms of any resulting agreement, labor contract terms
which have purely intra-unit effects appear to present the most compelling case for
foreclosing antitrust review.' 7
The restraints involved in the sports cases bear some resemblance to those that
would be favorably viewed under the exemption. The relevant unit for collective
bargaining includes all clubs within a particular league.", Thus, a league-wide
restraint, such as a compensation arrangement or a right of first refusal, only
affects those within the bargaining unit.' 9 Third party and product market effects
are generally not involved. Moreover, the subject matter of the restraints is inti-
mately related to the employment relationship and appears to be the sort of issue
that should be settled in collective bargaining. 20 But the case for immunity for the
restraints is not completed by these factors alone. Another critical issue concerns
the degree of employee consent that will be required before the employer can
claim the protection of the exemption. In the initial sports cases, the plaintiffs
contended that although a collective bargaining relationship may have existed, the
disputed restraints were thrust upon the player-employees and were not the
product of a true agreement. 2' Prior precedents provided little guidance on how
this objection should be evaluated. The answers provided by the sports cases may
be the most important contribution of these decisions. The development of that
15. Set, e.g., Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). See also Leslie, Principles of Labor
Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REv. 1183 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See also
Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Antucompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in
Its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REV. 680, 710 (1980).
17. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infia.
18. See, e.g., North Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980).
19. Some earlier varieties of restraints had unmistakable effects on persons outside the bargaining
unit. This was true, for example, of a reserve clause that gave a club perpetual claim to a player's services.
Such a clause could impede the ability of a competing league to acquire the players necessary to offer a
creditable sports product. See, e.g., Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462. (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also text accompanying notes 31-34 infra. This type of arrange-
ment is no longer used in the major professional leagues.
20. Litigation in the sports industry eventually produced a general agreement that the prevalent
forms of player restraints were mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Alexander v. NFL, 1977-
2 Trade Cas. 61,730 (D. Minn.), af'd sub nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
21. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), afd in part, rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606
(8th Cir. 1976). See also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), afd, 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 44: No. 4
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR AGREEMENTS
answer came quite slowly, however. A review of this development will indicate
both the range of initial disagreement and the relationship between the inquiry
into employee consent and the role of the courts in overseeing the collective bar-
gaining process.
A. The First Formulations
Under what circumstances will antitrust immunity be extended to restraints
which only have affects within the bargaining unit? One of the first considerations
of this issue in the sports context was undertaken in an article published in 1971 by
a Yale law student, Michael Jacobs, and his professor, Ralph Winter.22 The
Jacobs and Winter thesis was that the controversy surrounding the player
restraints was really not an antitrust concern at all, but rather was a matter for the
labor laws. The authors found that devices such as the draft system and reserve
clauses were mandatory subjects of bargaining and that each side had a duty to
bargain that could be enforced through the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). The article emphasized that the restraints had mainly intra-unit effects
and thus did not seem to rise to the threshold of antitrust review suggested by the
leading labor exemption precedents.
23
The approach taken by Jacobs and Winter did not require that they give
detailed treatment to the issue of the quality of employee consent required before
the exemption would attach. However, their basic thesis has important implica-
tions for the current question. Jacobs and Winter suggest that the essential ingredi-
ents for the exemption are that the restraint be a mandatory subject of bargaining
and that its primary effects be intra-unit. 24 This formulation did not require that
there be actual bargaining or employee consent before the hand of the antitrust
court would be stayed. Rather, immunity was apparently to flow from the pros-
pect of colllective bargaining, a prospect which was more than a mere potentiality
because the labor laws imposed on each side an administratively enforceable duty
to bargain.
This approach minimizes, almost to the point of preclusion, the role of anti-
trust courts in reviewing and evaluating the parties' collective agreement and the
negotiations that precede it. The court hearing the antitrust complaint need not
examine the labor contract or the exchanges which took place because these are
irrelevant to the issue of the exemption. The only relevant questions, again, con-
cern the characterization of the restraints as mandatory or permissive subjects of
bargaining and the degree of impact on persons not within the bargaining unit.
Neither issue should bring the court in conflict with labor policies favoring limited
review of collective bargaining agreements.
The Supreme Court precedent relied upon by Jacobs and Winter did support
the view that restraints which involved mandatory subjects of bargaining and
which only affected unit employees were prime candidates for antitrust immu-
22. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Pn'tciples and Collecitye Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81
YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
23. Id at 26-28.
24. Id
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nity.25 But the existing precedents could not be read as eliminating the require-
ment of actual employee consent. Indeed, the restraints that had been approved by
the Court stood in a much different light. The affected employees had not only
given their consent, but had actually first proposed the restraints and bargained
for their adoption.2 6 It seemed unlikely that the Court would treat this feature of
employee initiative as irrelevant.
The concern involved here can be illustrated by concrete cases. One is the
situation in which the employer group imposes upon the union a restraint which
was originally devised by the employers long before the union appeared on the
scene. A new union that was only beginning its collective bargaining role might be
so preoccupied by basic economic concerns that it gave no serious attention to the
restraint and never engaged in bargaining over it. A variation of this scenario is
one in which a strong, cohesive employer group is able to simply overpower an
established, but weak union and exact not a consent, but what is at best a non-
objection to a restraint devised wholly unilaterally by the employers. 2 7 Such a
restraint might be no different than one which would have been imposed if no
collective bargaining relationship existed. If the restraint would be subject to anti-
trust review in the latter case, it might be questioned why the results should be
different when the bargaining process is wholly ineffectual in altering the
employer-devised proposal.
The specific concern in these cases is that a grant of antitrust immunity would
move the labor exemption far beyond the legal policies from which it originated.
The first formulations of the exemptions were unmistakably intended to protect
union organizational activities and economic tactics 28 Thus, classic strikes, boy-
cotts and appeals to employees were removed from the purview of the antitrust
laws. As the the labor movement matured and the emphasis shifted from organi-
zation to collective bargaining, it was realized that agreements as well as actions
must be withdrawn from antitrust scrutiny. 29 In each instance, the ultimate objec-
tive of the labor exemption was the same-the furtherance of employees' goals
through collective action. 30 In the cases described above, the notion of furthering
25. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See also
Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitve Provision Devised by an Employer Group in
Its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REV. 680, 705 n.200, 710 (1980).
26. See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
27. The Executive Director of the NFL Players Association, Ed Garvey, has expressed concern as to
whether existing precedents would authorize judicial intervention in the situation in which a weak union is
overpowered in the bargaining process. See note 57 infra.
28. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 65, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1976)). See generally United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hoisery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940); E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 3-54, 99-117 (1930).
29. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See also
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
30. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), had a significant effect in cementing the notion
that the promotion of employee interests was a critical ingredient in the grant of the exemption. The
Court in Hutcheson applied the exemption to insulate a union from liability for certain secondary boycott
activities. In stating the conditions for the exemption, the Court emphasized that immunity was available
"[s]o long as [the] union acts in its self-interest" and also does not conspire with non-labor groups. Id. at
232. Later cases recognized that agreements with employers did not transgress the second element men-
tioned. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975);
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employee goals seems misplaced, for the employer is the only beneficiary of the
exemption.
It was not long before the debate about the role of employee consent moved
from the formative stage of the Jacobs and Winter article to the level of real world
litigation. The first significant judicial pronouncement came in 1972 and set a
tone which called for a more confined reading of the exemption. Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphi'a Hockey Club, Inc. 31 was brought as an antitrust
attack by the then recently formed World Hockey Association (WHA) clubs upon
the allegedly monopolistic grasp which the established National Hockey League
(NHL) held on hockey talent. The sources of the defendant's control over players
were a draft arrangement and a reserve system which severely limited the players'
ability to freely sell their services both within the league and without. The
defendant league argued that since the restraints were employment terms and
since a collective bargaining relationship existed between it and the affected
player, immunity should follow. The district court rejected this contention,
finding, among other things, that there never really had been any bargaining over
the restraint. Judge Higginbotham's conclusion clearly implies that the mere
potential for bargaining is not enough to produce immunity. The court was able
to distinguish existing Supreme Court precedents involving the labor exemption.
Judge Higginbotham noted that the term in question in those cases
pertained to issues which furthered the interests of the union members and on which there
had been extensive collective bargaining .... [T]hat is not true in this litigation. The
National Hockey League has not come forward with any substantial evidence which could
warrant this Court finding that the reserve clause . . . was ever a subject of serious, inten-
sive, arm's-length collective bargaining.
3 2
Rather, the reserve clause was found to be the product of unilateral employer
action which predated the advent of collective bargaining, and which continued as
a league practice even after the players' union was established.
The court did not need to define in detail the quality of consent which would
be sufficient to produce immunity. The restraints involved in the case had
another, more preliminary defect and that was that these effects were not merely
intra-unit. Indeed, the plaintiffs main objection, which was substantiated by the
evidence, was that the reserve system operated to prevent player movement to
competing leagues. 33 Because of this feature, and because the restraints were
clearly employer-designed, the defendants' claim of immunity was not
compelling.
34
A subsequent case involving the National Basketball Association (NBA) pro-
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). And while the requirement
of a pursuit of self-interest plays a less explicit role in recent decisions, it has not been abandoned. In the
cases where the Court applied the exemption, there has not been a basis to doubt whether the employee
interests were thereby promoted. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676 (1965); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959). See also St. Antoine,
Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 604 (1976).
31. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
32. Id at 498-99.
33. See id at 510-11.
34. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principlse and Collective Bargaining by Athletes." Of Superstars in Peonage, 81
YALE L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).
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vided a clearer test on the critical issue of the degree of employee involvement
necessary to produce immunity. In Robertson v. National Basketball Association ,35 the
defendant league attempted to secure judicial approval of the thesis that restraints
with purely intra-unit effects should be regarded as raising only labor law con-
cerns. The league's view was that a two-step test should be applied to determine
the availability of the exemption:
The test for applicability of the labor exemption . . . is twofold: (1) Are the challenged
practices directed against non-parties to the relationship; if they are not, then (2) are they
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining? If the answer to No. 1 is no and to No. 2 yes,
the practices are immune .... 36
This formulation, like that of Jacobs and Winter, was an invitation to the courts to
avoid any inquiry into the degree of employee acceptance of the disputed term.
The premise of this view, again, is that judicial decisions in this area should be
guided by the traditional labor policy of removing the bargaining process from
judicial scrutiny except as is necessary to establish that the statutory duty to bar-
gain has been met. 37 This expansive interpretation was well suited to the position
in which, the Robertson defendants found themselves. The restraints in question
there were largely the product of unilateral employer actions, and represented the
continuation of practices begun long before the union came into existence.
The league's argument did not impress District Court Judge Carter, however.
Nor was the judge prepared to search for subtle refinements of the league's pro-
posed two-step inquiry. Indeed, it was Judge Carter's view that "[t]he test pro-
posed by [the] NBA ha[d] no validity."' 38 Not only could he find no support for it
in the Supreme Court's labor exemption decisions, he also felt that the test asked
the wrong question. In Judge Carter's view, "The basic inquiry must focus on
determining whether the controverted practices or regulations were in the union's
own interest." '39 The Judge found it extremely difficult to believe that pervasive
restraints on player mobility could ever have been seen by the union as being in its
members' self-interest.
Judge Carter's opinion stands as evidence that courts were reluctant to
embrace the expansive reading of the labor exemption proposed by Jacobs and
Winter. However, the alternative view which it suggests is hardly satisfactory.
Robertson implies that terms proposed by the union may be exempt while those
originating with the employer will not. Such a rule would likely operate to
encourage elaborate and intricate posturing by the employer to induce the union
to make certain proposals which the employer desired. Thus, not only the sub-
stance of the proposal, but also the manner of its presentation would become mat-
35. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Other aspects of the case are treated at 1975-2 Trade Cas. $
60,448 (S.D.N.Y.) (further preliminary motions); 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.
1977) (review of class action settlement); 413 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 622 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1980)
(denying Wilt Chamberlain's right to pursue separate action against NBA); and 479 F. Supp. 657
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), afd in part, rev'd in part, 625 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1980) (review of compensation award to
Seattle SuperSonics for loss of free agent, Marvin Webster, to N. Y. Knicks).
36. 389 F. Supp. at 886 (quoting NBA Memorandum at 28).
37. See notes 1l-13supra.
38. 389 F. Supp. at 889.
39. Id
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ters to be arranged between the parties. This approach seems quite far-removed
from the model of bargaining embodied in the labor laws. The mutual nature of
the statutory duty to bargain and the law's general preference for freedom of con-
tract suggest that the proposals of neither side are to be preferred.
B. Refinement of the Grounds for Immunity
Because the initial Robertson decision was not appealed, there was no occasion
for correcting the misleading impression which it gave. However, at the same time
as Robertson, the major professional football league was defending one of its own
player restraints in Mackey v. National Football League 4 The Rozelle Rule, an
arrangement for compensating clubs for the loss of a player signed by another
team, provided the focus for the litigation. The case presented the first occasion for
an appellate court to address the question of the threshold for the labor exemption.
The test eventually announced by the Eighth Circuit incorporates the two-step
inquiry advocated by the NBA in Robertson and originally suggested by Jacobs and
Winter. The court went further, however, and added a critical third element
which examines the quality of the union's assent to the term in question. In the
court's view, a restraint, such as the Rozelle Rule, enjoys antitrust immunity if it
[f]irst . . affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. . .. [s]econd,
• . . concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining . . . . [and third] . . . is the
product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
4 1
By the time of Mackey, there was little room for disputing that the Rozelle Rule
satisfied the first two elements. The rule had its main impact on the NFL players
themselves, and because it so directly affected "conditions of employment," it
appeared to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. 4 2 The third requirement of
bona fide arm's length bargaining required a more detailed review on the facts of
Mackey.
The players' union and the NFL owners had entered into two collective bar-
gaining agreements prior to the initiation of the Mackey litigation. In the negotia-
tions preceding the first agreement in 1968, the player restraints received little
attention. This was the first bargaining effort by the new union, and its relatively
weak bargaining position apparently dictated that attention be focused on basic
issues relating to compensation and pensions. The resulting collective bargaining
agreement did incorporate the league constitution and by-laws, of which the
Rozelle Rule was a part.4 3 The agreement also provided that rules on free agency
would not be amended during the term of the labor contract.4 4 When this agree-
40. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), afd in part, rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
41. 543 F.2d at 614 (citations omitted).
42. Some earlier cases had disputed this conclusion. See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. at 1009; Rob-
ertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. at 890. However, it seemed undeniable that restraints such as the Rozelle
Rule have an impact upon the conditions under which players are employed. Indeed, the restraints had
long been objected to by the players unions, precisely because they were such an important term of
employment. See also Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Prmncipes and Collectie Bargaining of Athletes: Of Superstars in
Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971). The fact that the unions objected to the restraints did not mean that
they vigorously bargained against them. See text following this note.
43. 543 F.2d at 613.
44. Id
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ment expired, the, parties resumed negotiations and eventually signed a new agree-
ment in 1970. The matter of player restraints again received little attention in the
bargaining sessions, and the final agreement included no express reference to the
Rozelle Rule. However, negotiators for both the owners and the players testified
that it was understood that the restraint would continue in effect under the 1970
agreement. 45 At the time of the Mackey decision, the 1970 agreement had expired
and subsequent negotiations had not produced a new agreement. 46 The court's
characterization of the Mackey facts suggests that the case is one of a weak union
mustering its limited strength to deal with a limited range of issues, mostly in the
areas of pension and other economic benefits. It is suggested that the matter of the
Rozelle Rule did not come within the union's narrow bargaining focus, and that
the union did not resist the employers' efforts to continue its past practice. Thus,
while there was a bargaining relationship between the parties, it was of a most
preliminary sort. 47 In the court's view, this was not sufficient to establish the bona
fide arm's-length bargaining necessary to satisfy the third element of its test. The
court seemed particularly influenced by the fact that the form of the restraint
"[hJad remained unchanged since it was unilaterally promulgated by the clubs in
1963. ' '48 The union's mere lack of resistance to the status quo did not constitute
the type of consent which the court thought was required for immunity.
45. Id
46. NFL management representatives contended that the presence of the Mackey litigation impeded
the process of collective bargaining. See Oversight Hearings on National Football League Labor-Management Dis-
pute.. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 51-55 (1975). See also Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. $ 61,730, at 72,997 (D. Minn.).
Another view is that Mackey was necessary to remove an unfair bargaining advantage that the owners
enjoyed as a result of their maintenance of illegal restraints. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF
SPORTS 586-88 (1979).
47. See text following note 42 supra.
48. 543 F.2d at 616.
An interesting question arises as to the availability of other grounds upon which a union might object
to an employer's continuation of a player restraint devised before collective bargaining was initiated. A
case of potential relevance is Morio v. North Am. Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y.), aj'd, 632
F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980). Among other things it was alleged that the NASL signed new individual player
contracts and continued to enforce pre-existing contracts while under a duty to bargain with a newly
formed players' union. The Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board received complaints
that these actions constituted unfair labor practices. In the present proceeding, the Regional Director
petitioned the court for an order enjoining the enforcement of the individual contracts. The statutory basis
for the request was section 10(j) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 which empowers the
Board to seek injunctions and other appropriate relief while its consideration of unfair labor practice
charges is pending. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976). The district court issued an injunction against the
enforcement of the individual contracts and this was affirmed on appeal.
The district court found that the individual contracts were "apparently" in violation of the employers'
duty to bargain with the union. 501 F. Supp. at 639. With the individual contracts in place, the court
observed, "[Tihere simply is no incentive for Respondents to bargain with the Union .... " Id at 640.
Hence, an injunction was issued. In affirming, the court of appeals adopted the lower court's findings and
added that there was sufficient evidence that the league's practices were undermining the position of the
union and might render ineffective the remedies eventually entered in the Board's unfair labor practice
proceeding. 632 F.2d at 218.
An order such as that entered in Motto could have the effect of forcing the league to abandon the
continuation of pre-existing player restraints. If the league members could neither enforce prior contracts
nor sign new ones, there would be doubt as to the contractual basis for a club's invocation of a restraint.
While the order actually entered in Morio specifically preserved the club's right to retain "exclusive rights"
in a player, 501 F. Supp. at 639, this exception appears to be highly discretionary and its exact meaning
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There are several aspects of the Macky case which are worthy of note. For one
thing, Mackey implicitly rejects the approach to the labor exemption reflected in
Judge Carter's opinion in Robertson. Judge Carter insisted that antitrust immunity
would not be available unless some important employee interest was furthered.
49
Mackey avoids that line of analysis and emphasizes instead that it is the nature of
the bargaining which is relevant for exemption purposes, not the source of the
proposal term or the structure 6f the debated provision. This approach seems
sound, for if the requisite level of bargaining is found, it is unnecessary to ask the
additional question of whether employee interests are furthered. In a bargaining
relationship entitled to respect, the prevailing policy of freedom of contract dic-
tates that the union be allowed to decide for itself how employee self-interest is best
protected.
50
Mackey thus made an important contribution by clarifying which of several
potential issues was most critical in defining the threshold for the labor exemption.
It is not the question of employee self-interest, or whether the terms agreed upon
were reasonable compromises, but rather the quality of the employee's consent to
the terms in question.5' As noted, the exemption, at least in the nonstatutory ver-
sion applicable to the present problems, is premised on a policy of respect for col-
lective bargaining.52 It is thus highly relevant to ask whether there has ever been
an agreement on the disputed devices. The mere fact that there is a labor contract
between the parties is not a guarantee that all aspects of their relationship are the
product of consent.
53
Although Mackey brings into sharper focus the central issue in the player
restraint cases, the decision raises other questions which warrant attention. The
concern for the quality of employee consent invites courts to sit in judgment of the
collective bargaining process and the agreement that is reached. But what degree
of judicial intervention is authorized? To what extent will the traditional labor
somewhat unclear. It is not obvious that it would insure the enforceability of all player restraints. It is not
obvious, for example, that a draft system or requirements for free agent compensation would be protected.
To the extent that any restraints could be made unenforceable by a Morio-type injunction, the question
arises as to whether the availability of such relief lessens the strength of the players' antitrust case. The
argument could be made that during periods when the employer is unilaterally invoking pre-existing
restraints, the labor laws and the remedies these provide should be given preemptive effect. Such a prefer-
ence for the labor solution might be seen as consistent with the policies that give rise to the more common
applications of the labor exemption.
49. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
50. See authorities cited in note 12 supra. See also Modjeska, Guess Who's Coming to the Bargaining Table?,
39 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 432-35 (1978).
51. For a commentary that gives further attention to the role of employee self-interest in the definition
of the availability of the exemption, see Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Antiompetitive
Provision Devised by an Employer Group in Its Own Interest- McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REV.
680, 696-97 (1980). The author of the note indicates some reservations about the Mackey court's refusal to
give more emphasis to the need for agreements which promote employee interests. See id at 704-06.
52. This point received particular emphasis by the court in Macky. See 543 F.2d at 612, 613-14.
53. Another context in which there is reason to question the quality of the employees' consent involves
cases in which it is alleged that the union is a creation of the employer and its collective bargaining agree-
ment a sham. Some of these cases raise antitrust issues, typically when a complaint is brought by a rival,
legitimate union. See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d
384 (3d Cir. 1973); Carpenters District Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1973).
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policies of freedom of contract be respected? The Mackey opinion has some notable
implications on these points.
Mackey affords immunity only when the disputed term is the product of bona
fide arm's-length bargaining. One passage of the opinion might be read as sug-
gesting that a court is authorized to review in detail the negotiations which yielded
the disputed term. The defendant league contended, in effect, that while the
Rozelle Rule was largely the continuation of unilateral management practice of
long standing, the defendant had bargained over this term and given a quidpro quo
for its continuation. 54 The alleged quidpro quo was increased pension benefits and
the right of players to negotiate salaries individually. The court of appeals
approved the district court's finding that there had been no such quid pro quo
arrangement. 5 5 That conclusion, however, presupposes that there was a careful
review of what occurred at the bargaining table, and apparently such an examina-
tion had been undertaken. The court does not suggest any limit on the type of
inquiry to be undertaken, and the opinion may be read to mean that the review is
not to be confined.56 Relatedly, some may see the further implication that if a
court finds an exchange, it is empowered to determine whether the union received
"enough" for the concession it made. For example, what if the apparent quidpro
quo for incorporation of pervasive restraints was the employer's agreement to a
request by a weak union for a small adjustment in the player per diem expenses?
Some might read Mackey as suggesting that the availability of immunity depends
on whether a district court judge is satisfied that what was received by the union
was fair value for what was given up. 57
54. 543 F.2d at 616.
55. .d
56. The court evaluated the league's evidence on the quidpro quo argument and found it lacking. See
id. at 616 n.17. The unrestrained nature of the court's review again suggests that there is no substantive
rule limiting the evidence to be considered and that had more evidence been presented, a more detailed
appraisal would have been required.
57. Ed Garvey, Executive Director of the NFL Players Association, raised these same concerns in an
article published after the Mackey decision. While Mr. Garvey advocated detailed judicial review of the
bargaining process, he expressed doubts as to whether Mack would be given such an expansive reading:
While some union advocates might feel elation at the sudden elevation of the union's role, the
Eighth Circuit decision was indeed a mixed blessing. If the athlete is now denied access to the courts
under the labor exemption theory, how is he protected if his union is overwhelmed by management?
What if the union accepts the old baseball renewable option in return for increased pension money?
In other words, what is the result if the union gives away player rights in exchange for pet projects of
the leadership? What happens if the union is too weak to resist management's insistence on a restric-
tive reserve system?
The court has placed an enormous burden on the shoulders of the union, particularly when the
union is bargaining with [twenty-eight] millionaires operating an unregulated monopoly. In effect,
the courts have handed off the antitrust laws to the sports unions and left the stadium. They aren't
even going to sit and watch the results.
The NFL Players Association argues that each restriction on the professional athlete must be
examined on its own merits. The NFLPA does not believe that the old draft and the Rozelle Rule
could be accepted as a quid pro quo for economic gain but that position is in some doubt. The Mackey
court did not decide the quid pro quo issue but it would be difficult to believe that a court will go
behind a collective bargaining agreement to determine whether or not there truly was good faith
bargaining on a reserve system. The assumption will be that if it's in an agreement then the union
accepted it in good faith.
Garvey, From Chattel to Employee.- The Athlete's Questfor Freedom and Dignity, 445 ANNALS 91, 100 (1979).
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The prospect of courts engaging in qualitative appraisals of the terms of an
exchange raises numerous problems. At the practical level is the question of
whether the details of the bargaining process can ever be accurately reconstructed.
Incomplete record keeping and an abiding tendency toward "posturing" make
such reconstructions risky. 58  Beyond that is the general problem that such
inquiries run contrary to an otherwise well-entrenched general labor policy against
subjecting collective bargaining to detailed scrutiny.59 If the premises of this
policy are sound, the courts may find that the potential of their detailed review
ultimately inhibits bargaining and deters peaceful resolution of labor disputes.
These, of course, are the "horrors" which prompted some persons, including
authors Jacobs and Winter, to define a threshold for the exemption which com-
pletely eliminated any appraisal of the nature of the bargain which had taken
place. 6°
A review of earlier precedent established that the notion of bona fide arm's-
length bargaining used by the Mackey court as a critical ingredient for immunity
was not intended by other courts to authorize the sort of substantive appraisal of
the parties' bargain that might be encouraged by Mackey. The bona fide arm's-
length bargaining language can be traced back through earlier sports cases to the
Supreme Court's decision in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Com-
pany. 6 1 Jewel Tea arose from the efforts of the butchers' union to impose certain
marketing hours restrictions on grocery stores in the Chicago area.62 Several stores
agreed to a rule requiring meat counters to be closed at 6 p.m., even in grocery
stores that were otherwise open for business. Jewel Tea Company sought a modifi-
cation of the rule because it desired to operate self-service meat counters in the
evening. The union refused to vary the provision and threatened a strike. Jewel
Tea Company at first capitulated and signed the pertinent multi-employer bar-
gaining agreement. Later, however, the chain filed a suit attacking the arrange-
58. An interesting illustration of the collateral uses of collective bargaining terms and actions related
thereto is found in Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d
615 (8th Cir. 1976). The parties had included in their collective bargaining agreement a provision which
recited that the agreement did not "deal with" the reserve system, even though the owners contended that
the system continued in effect. Id at 618. It later became important to determine what was meant by the
language used. One participant in the negotiations offered this explanation: "[T]his language was an
ambiguous, intentionally ambiguous, compromise of a point that would give both parties an opportunity
to get up before a Congressional Committee and argue whether or not something had been done in the
area of the Reserve System ... d"  at 628.
Although it was recited that the agreement did not "deal with" the reserve system, this statement was
not entirely correct. The matter was obviously discussed and language was included which settled the issue
for at least the time being. Moreover, the language was acceptable because it allowed the two parties to
maintain diametrically opposed positions in more public forums. In these cases, where the agreement is
not a candid recitation of the parties' intentions, there is an exacerbation of the problem of potentially
unreliable evidence of what happened during negotiations.
59. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust trnciples and Collective Bargaining by Athletes. Of Superstars in
Peonage, YALE L.J. 1, 12-13 (1971).
61. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). It was Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1972), which first used language from Jewel Tea incorporating the
bargaining standard.
62. A detailed discussion of the law before and afterJewel Tea can be found in Meltzer, Labor Unions,
Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659 (1965).
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ment on antitrust grounds. The Supreme Court chose the case for one of its most
significant labor exemption decisions and ultimately found the marketing hours
restriction to be exempt. The Court identified the essence of the controversy
before it in a passage of the opinion thought to have significance for the sports
cases. In the words of Justice White:
Thus, the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction . . . is so intimately
related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain
that provision through bona fide, arm 's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union
policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the
protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.
6 3
As an initial matter,Jewel Tea is of only limited value for the issue presented in
a case such as Mackey. The restraint inJewe Tea, unlike those litigated in the
sports cases, had an unmistakeable impact on the employer's ability to market its
products. 64 Because the impact of this restriction extended well beyond the imme-
diate bargaining unit, it touched more closely on traditional antitrust concerns
and thus attracted more exacting antitrust scrutiny than should the restraints in
the sports cases, which are more purely within the labor law sphere.
65
But apart from that point, it is doubtful that Justice White intended his refer-
ence to bona fide arm's-length bargaining to announce the benchmark for
granting antitrust immunity. A more accurate view of the case is that the Court
was simply characterizing the nature of the bargaining which had taken place in
Jewel Tea and was thus implicitly indicating that the facts before it raised no ques-
tion about the quality of the union's endorsement of the restraint. Indeed, the
restraint was a creation of the union and a product of its successful bargaining.
6 6
We learn little from this situation that will help us decide cases in which the
restraint is less identified with employee interests. Nor is there much evidence that
the Court understood that it was weighing the delicate question of labor policy
that would be involved in attempting to reenact the course of a prior negotiation
on an employee-requested restraint. 6 7 Again, the language chosen by the Court
indicates that it was considering a much different question.
All of this suggests that the Mackey case should not be overread. Neither the
specific language of Mackey nor the cited precedents invite later courts to make a
detailed appraisal of the fairness of any exchange which might have taken place.
Mackey can be taken as holding only that on the facts before the court, there had
been no exchange, no bargaining, and no consent. Mackey is thus properly read as
a case in which the disputed restraint had not yet entered the sphere of collective
63. 381 U.S. at 689-90 [emphasis added].
64. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Prina Oles and Collective Bargainng by Athletes. Of Superstars in Peonage,
81 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1971).
65. See Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shieldihg an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an
Employer Group th Its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REV. 680, 710 (1980).
66. See note 30 supra.
67. Other factors bearing on the debate over the feasibility of reconstructing the details of prior nego-
tiating sessions are raised in Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 1978 N.L.R.B Dec. [ 19,539; Reed
& Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. No. 850 (1951), enforced 205 F.2d 131 (lst Cir. 1953); NLRB Gen. Counsel
Q. Rep., [1978] 98 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 61, 63-64; Modjeska, Guess Who's Coming to the Bargaihig Table,
39 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 423 (1978).
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bargaining. It was, of course, a potential subject of bargaining. But the union's
presence indicated no greater employee approval of the restraint than existed
when the employer first imposed it several years before.
C. Implementation of the Mackey Test
Some two years after Mackey the courts were presented with another test of the
appropriateness of judicial inquiry into the details of the parties' bargaining his-
tory. The case, MCourt v. Caifornia Sports, Inc. ,68 is notable for its seeming confir-
mation of some of the troublesome implications of Mackey. The courts that passed
on the McCourt complaint involved themselves in rather detailed factual findings
concerning the negotiations that produced the restraint in dispute. The case does
not reach the wrong result, however, and its main difficulty is the message which it
delivers with respect to the treatment of future controversies.
The restraint in McCourt originated in By-Law Section 9A of the league's gov-
erning document. The bylaw authorized free agency for players who had played
out their options, but also provided for a compensation arrangement under which
a club hiring a free agent had to make an equalization payment to the player's
original employer. The payment could take the form of player contracts, draft
choices, or cash. In the event that the two clubs could not agree, compensation
was determined by an arbitrator, who was empowered to select only between the
last offer of each side.69 The bylaw was unilaterally devised by management after
the original reserve system was disapproved in Philadelphia World Hockey Club.
70
Subsequent collective bargaining between the owners and the players led to inclu-
sion of the bylaw, in unaltered form, in the league's labor agreement.
Plaintiff McCourt's complaint arose from the fact that his contract with the
NHL's Detroit club was selected as the means of compensating the Los Angeles
club for the loss of a free agent signed by Detroit. 71 In McCourt's view, the NHL
arrangement was quite similar to the NFL's Rozelle Rule condemned in Mackey.
The main difference was that, in the absence of an amicable settlement by the
clubs themselves, decisions on compensation were to be made by an independent
arbitrator rather than the league president. This resemblance to the Rozelle Rule,
and the fact that the bylaw was the unilateral creation of the club owners,
prompted the district court judge to deny the applicability of the labor exemption
and to declare the restraint illegal. This judgment did not stand, however. On
appeal, a majority of the three-member Sixth Circuit panel found the bargaining
between the league and the union sufficient to warrant antitrust immunity. This
68. 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
69. See general/Y J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 514-16 (1979); Comment, The
National Hockey League Reserve System. A Restraint of Trade?, 56 J. URBAN L. 467, 473-76 (1979).
70. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa.
1972). See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
71. The use of the contracts of existing players as "payment" in compensation arrangements has
always been controversial. In an earlier case, the transferred player's objection prompted a court to enjoin
the assignment of the contract. Bryant v. National Football League, Docket No. CV 75-2543 (C.D. Cal.,
July 30, 1975) (TRO granted), order d'ssolved, id (C.D. Cal., Aug. 7, 1975). See also Los Angeles Times, July
26, 1975, Pt. III, at 1, col. 1; id, July 27, 1975, Pt. III, at 1, col. 2; id, July 31, 1975, Pt. III, at 1, col. 5;
id, Aug. 2, 1975, Pt. III, at 1, col. 1; id, Aug. 5, 1975, Pt. III, at 1, col. 5.
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conclusion was not without its detractors, however. Among them was Chief Judge
Edwards, who entered a long dissent.
72
The district court and the majority of the Sixth Circuit panel accepted the
general tests for the labor exemption proposed in the Mackey decision. As in
Mackey, the critical question in McCourt was whether the restraints in question were
the product of bona fide arm's-length collective bargaining. It was on this point
that the two courts differed. In finding the bargaining to be insufficient, the dis-
trict court emphasized that the compensation rule was written into the collective
bargaining agreement in language identical to that contained in the league-cre-
ated bylaw and cited testimony of the union representative to the effect that the
owners had made it clear that they regarded By-law 9A as non-negotiable. 73 The
owners responded that even though the bylaw had been adopted by the union
substantially unchanged, the union had received several concessions in exchange
for their consent to the arrangement. These allegedly included increased pension
benefits, continuation of individualized salary negotiations, and a share of the pro-
ceeds from a planned international hockey competition.7 4  However, the district
court found-presumably as a matter of fact-that these concessions were not
given for the union's agreement to By-Law 9A, but rather represented trade-offs on
other matters.7 5  The district court indicated that it had before it a situation in
which a nonnegotiated, employer-devised term had merely been inserted into a
collective bargaining agreement "to give the impression" that it had been bar-
gained for.
76
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, of course, had to work with the same facts as the
lower court. Moreover, the appellate court was restrained by the traditional
requirement of respect for the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erro-
neous. 7 7 Nonetheless, the majority of the Sixth Circuit was drawn to a different
conclusion on the quality of the parties' bargaining. 78 The court first introduced a
refinement of the legal standard to be applied. While accepting that the ultimate
test was whether there was bona fide arm's-length bargaining, the court thought
that the concept of bargaining must take account of labor law precedents that
define when the statutory duty to bargain is satisfied. Particularly relevant, in the
court's view, were labor cases recognizing that the duty to bargain does not obli-
gate a party, such as the league in McCourt, to modify demands which it puts forth.
A position on a particular issue may be adopted and firmly maintained if the
proponent is prepared to continue to meet at the bargaining table, engage in dis-
72. 600 F.2d 1193, 1206-18 (6th Cir. 1979) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
73. 460 F. Supp. at 911.
74. Id
75. Id.: "We cannot find from this evidence that the increased pension benefits, the right for players
to negotiate salaries and the right to share in the proceeds from international hockey competition are
directly related to collective bargaining on bylaw 9A."
76. Id See text between notes 26-28 supra. See also text accompanying note 58 supra.
77. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585 (1971).
78. The majority's treatment of the lower court's finding on the trade-offs in bargaining was a source
of particular concern for dissenting Judge Edwards. Set 600 F.2d at 1213-14.
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cussions, and reach accommodations on other matters. 79 The court quoted with
approval the view of the Fifth Circuit that "[i]f the insistence is genuinely and
sincerely held, if it is not mere window dressing, it may be maintained forever
though it produce[s] a stalemate."8 0
This precedent allowed the Sixth Circuit to take a different view of the facts
indicating that the owners had refused to accept modification of By-Law 9A. It
was the majority's view that "[clontrary to the trial judge's conclusion, the very
facts relied upon by him . . . illustrate a classic case of collective bargaining in
which the reserve system was a central issue.""' What the trial judge saw as unilat-
eral employer action, and an overriding of employee will, the Sixth Circuit saw as
merely rigorous bargaining. Thus the court noted that the union had invoked the
standard bargaining tools-a threatened strike, refusals to attend bargaining ses-
sions, threatened litigation-but was simply unsuccessful. 82 In the majority view,
the employer was not intransigent, however, for it made concessions on matters
other than the disputed bylaw.
A significant impediment to the appellate court's characterization was the
explicit finding by the trial judge that employer concessions on several matters,
including pension benefits, individual salary negotiations, and a share of the pro-
ceeds of a planned international competition, were not a quid pro quo for the
players' assent to the compensation arrangement. The normal rules of appellate
review did not allow the court merely to declare the trial court to be in error on
this point. Hence, another tack was necessary if the finding was to be avoided.
The approach apparently selected by the appellate court was to ignore the lower
court's contrary finding and to list a number of concessions made by the employers
to preserve their version of the compensation arrangement. Indeed, in a somewhat
innocuous footnote, the appellate court sets forth a list of benefits received by the
players for their assent to the bylaw that includes not only the three rejected by the
district court, but also seven others not mentioned by the lower court.8 3 Thus
what the district court had seen as an absence of bargaining was resurrected as
bargaining rigorous enough to satisfy the threshold of the labor exemptions.
8 4
The majority's opinion makes a notable contribution to the labor exemption
79. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 481-89 (1976). See also note 86 nfra.
80. 600 F.2d at 1201, cziing NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960).
81. Id at 1202.
82. Id
83. Id. at n.12:
Mr. Eagleson, the Executive Director of the NHLPA, testified that the union agreed to the provi-
sions of By-Law Section 9A in return for many player benefits. In addition to the benefits described in
the district judge's opinion, our review of the record indicates that the players bargained for substan-
tial benefits: (I)increased pension benefits; (2) increased bonus money to players on teams finishing
high in their divisions and participating in the Stanley Cup Playoffs; (3) sharing with the owners
receipts from international hockey games; (4) greater salary continuation for players injured as a result
of playing hockey; (5) increased training camp expense allowances; (6) modification of NHL waiver
procedures; and (7) modification in scheduling of games and travel during the season.
84. Dissenting Judge Edwards was clearly not enamored by the Sixth Circuit majority's willingness to
give a different characterization to the factual findings of the trial court. Judge Edwards found no
extraordinary feature in the trial court record which impugned the findings as clearly erroneous. Id at
1214, 1218. The dissent went further and suggested that the majority's grant of immunity was unprece-
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precedent by its firm suggestion that the mere fact that a collective bargaining
term was originally devised unilaterally by management should not, in itself, be a
reason for withholding immunity. It is understandable that a players' union
which might ultimately agree to some form of restraint would be hesitant to
assume a leadership role in propounding and promoting one particular version.
There are good political reasons why union leadership would not want to appear
to be advocating that players give up their mobility. More palatable is a position
by the leadership that it used the employer's desire for a particular type of
restraint as a lever to pry out major concessions on other matters.
The general point to be drawn here is that any regulation in this area must
take account of the tremendous capacity of management and labor to mask their
true intentions as they proceed through collective bargaining.85 One implication
of the district court's approach is that the court might have viewed the matter
differently if the league had started from a negotiating position which demanded a
restraint much more severe than By-Law 9A and then "allowed" itself to be bar-
gained down to a rule which incorporated By-Law 9A provisions. 8 6 In such a pro-
cess, the employer would be well-advised to link each step to a union concession on
some other point, which in itself may have begun from an inflated position. But a
legal standard which expects great refinement and detailed exchange in collective
bargaining will be too subject to manipulation. Thus, we should agree with the
appellate court that it is not troublesome that the final version of the agreed-upon
restraint was the product of the employers' hands and was unchanged from the
earliest proposal.87
There are other aspects of the McCourt opinions which require a more critical
appraisal, however. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit assume that it is
appropriate to make the availability of the labor exemption dependent upon the
outcome of a detailed factual inquiry into the bargaining that took place between
the parties. The appellate court was as interested as the district judge in the spe-
cifics of the bargaining process; it simply thought that these details supported a
different conclusion than that reached in the initial proceeding.8 8 There are at
least two difficulties with this approach. One has been previously mentioned and
concerns the fact that there are serious limitations on the quality of evidence' which
can be produced on the nuances of the bargaining.8 9 The reliability of relevant
dented and unwise. In Judge Edwards' view, employer cartel activity ought not to be immunized simply
because its authorization is incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement.
85. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
86. The technique appraised here is to be distinguished from the type of "take-it-or-leave-it" bar-
gaining that is known as Boulwarism. Boulwarism occurs when the employer commences negotiations by
announcing its "fair and firm offer" through a massive publicity campaign directed at the employees and
the general public. This strategy functions to circumvent the union and it forces the employer to adhere to
its initial offer in order to avoid embarrassment. This strategy was held to be illegal in NLRB v. General
Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 1964 N.L.R.B. Dec. 13,651, enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 383, 486-88 (1976).
87. See 600 F.2d at 1202.
88. See notes 58, 67 supra and accompanying text.
89. Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 1978 N.L.R.B. Dec. 19,539; Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
96 N.L.R.B. No. 850 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (lst Cir. 1953).
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evidence is undermined by the informality of the proceedings and the fact that
they may be carried on at several different levels, both outside and within the
bargaining room. Moreover, not only is a transcript not required, a party con-
cerned about the future uses of the bargaining history may well commit an unfair
labor practice.if it requests such transcription. 90 One of the reasons given by the
National Labor Relations Board for its stringent policy on this point is a desire not
to make the parties accountable for all that is said at the bargaining table.9 1 Such
a view is hardly compatible with a legal standard which causes multi-million
dollar antitrust liability to turn on the specifics of the negotiations.
92
The issue of the reliability of the evidence looms large in McCourt. The legal
outcome is determined by whether the union's acquiescence to the restraint was
given in exchange for substantial employer concessions on other matters, as the
appellate court concluded, or whether it bore no relation to these concessions and
was no more than the product of the overriding will of the employer, as the district
court indicated. One does not come away from the two opinions with great confi-
dence that one factual reconstruction of what actually happened is better than the
other.93 What may be more believable is that bargaining is a dynamic process,
and it is often difficult to tell what really produced a particular set of terms.
A second problem with the approach taken in the McCourt decisions is that it
can undermine significantly the finality of the collective bargaining agreement. A
desire for conclusiveness in labor negotiations is an important ingredient in the
general policy of limiting judicial review of collective bargaining agreements. It is
perceived that the availability of extensive post-agreement review will likely
undermine the parties' willingness to bargain. 94 The possibility that a concession
achieved will later be thrown out by a court will lessen the beneficiaries' inclina-
90. See NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1978] 98 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 61, 63-63; Modjeska, Guess
Who's Coming to the Bargaimng Table?, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 416-17 (1978).
91. See, e.g., Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 1978-79 N.L.R.B. Dec. 15,065, at
28,234 (1978).
92. There are some situations in which the imperfect evidence of the parties' negotiating history must
be considered if the purposes of the Act are to be fulfilled. This is true, for example, where there is a
question as to whether a party fulfilled its duty to bargain in good faith. See Modjeska, Guess Who's coming
to the Barganing Table?, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 420-21 (1978). The fact that consideration of such evidence
is necessary in some situations is, of course, not a concern for its use in other settings. Indeed, it would seem
reasonable to suggest that in deciding the weight to be accorded such evidence, a legal system may prop-
erly take account of the magnitude of the substantive issue which will be affected by the evidence. The
consequence of finding a lack of good faith in bargaining is relatively mild. Often the offending party is
simply ordered to resume bargaining. Other issues, such as the availability of antitrust immunity, are
potentially much more significant. The evidence of this in the sports area is the dramatic increase in the
players' mobility and salary following the judicial rejection of claims of immunity. See, e.g., Alexander v..
NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,730, at 72,997-98 (D. Minn.), aj'dsub nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280
(8th Cir. 1978) (discussion of monetary settlement and new mobility rules prompted by Macky decision).
93. One student commentator who has written on the case has concluded that the factual question of
whether there was an exchange is indeed a close one. See Comment, The National Hocker League Reserve
System: A Restraint of Trade?, 56 J. URBAN LAW 467, 496 (1979). It is also suggested that the court of appeals
may not have considered all the facts relevant to its ultimate conclusion that there was a quid pro quo
relationship between the restraint and other benefits. Id
94. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485-88 (1960); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). Seegenerall, H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRO-
CEss 26-30, 49-63 (1968). Compare Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Pinciples and Collective Bargaiing by Athletes.- Of
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1971).
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tion to give a significant exchange. The ultimate horror would be a judicial order
invalidating one part of a bargain, such as an agreement on player restraints, but
continuing enforcement of expensive economic benefits, given to induce the
concession.
The preference for finality has not meant that judicial review is to be entirely
foreclosed. Such an absolute policy would invite the frustration of significant
national policies ranging from those seeking to insure equal employment opportu-
nity to those designed to disapprove illegal business combinations. 95 But even on
this point, the desire to maximize the meaningfulness of the negotiations can have
a significant impact. Respect for this policy may limit occasions for judicial
inquiry or operate to confine the review that is actually undertaken. 96 A notable
implication for our present purposes is that exceptions to the basic policy should be
defined by resort to standards which insure a degree of predictability.
It is questionable whether the McCourt approach shows adequate sensitivity to
these concerns. McCourl deals with the "exception" to nonreviewability which is
made for violations of the antitrust laws. McCourt implicitly addressed the critical
question of the conditions which will authorize judicial forays into consummated
agreements. McCourt seems to assume that such a review is authorized anytime
competitive violations are alleged. And the data to be appraised, of course,
includes any evidence which contributes to a reconstruction of the bargain and an
identification of the resulting exchange. 9 7 While an exception to nonreviewability
is needed, the legal system should prefer one utilizing standards which more care-
fully relate the occasions of judicial review to the likelihood that the complaining
party will ultimately be successful when it breaches the veil of immunity. If good
predictors of effective consent could be found, not only would some allegiance to
the policy of finality be introduced, but also resort to unreliable evidence would be
avoided.
D. A Proposal: A Presumption of Consent
Mackey and McCourt were indeed on the right track in suggesting that the qual-
ity of employee consent is important in appraising the respect to be accorded to
the collective bargaining agreement. What is needed, however, is a different
vehicle for identifying the collective agreements to be respected. The search for a
different standard of review can properly proceed from the premise that the details
of the actual bargaining may be less important than the quality of the collective
bargaining relationship which exists between the parties. If the parties to the dis-
puted agreement have a long-standing and well-established bargaining relation-
ship-if they have been through numerous agreements and each indicated a
95. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). See also text accompanying
notes 8-13 supra.
96. See Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467,
471-74 (1964).
97. While McCourt is the first court to make a detailed appraisal of the parties' exchange in assessing
the availability of the labor exemption, at least one other court seems to have accepted this technique. See
Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. $ 61,730, at 73,001 (D. Minn.), aJ'dsub nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584
F.2d 280 (1978).
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willingness to settle matters through collective bargaining-it is difficult to
imagine the justification for questioning the effectiveness of either side's consent to
a particular term in a particular negotiation. 9 A history of strong bargaining
should carry its own indicia that the rights of employees are not being subverted. 99
It is a virtual tautology that a strong union which consents to a contract term has
not been subjected to overreaching by the employer. Strong evidence of collusion
should be required before the affirmation by a stable union is avoided. 10 0
A significant attraction of evaluating the nature of the parties' relationship
rather than the details of their bargain is that the relevant evidence does not share
the defects of the proof required by the McCourt approach. The length of the par-
ties' relationship, the substantiality of their contract terms relative to those pre-
vailing elsewhere, and the durability of prior agreements are more susceptible to
external, objective proof. While other more subjective data may also be relevant,
the objectively demonstrable aspects of the relationship should serve as a check
against unwarranted or misguided inferences.
In some cases, of course, the relationship between the union and the employer
does not warrant the presumption of consent which is suggested here. Two classes
of cases will be especially suspect. One involves newly formed collective bar-
gaining relationships. Seldom does the union in this situation enter bargaining
with the same authority enjoyed by those who have represented the employer's
workers through numerous contracts. Nor are energies expended with equal force
among various collective bargaining terms. Wages, pensions, and other economic
benefits are likely to receive the union's first focus rather than the work rules typi-
cally involved in antitrust challenges. If the union itself is a new creation, the
restrictive nature of the initial bargaining is likely to be exacerbated.
The other class of cases warranting closer scrutiny are those in which there is
evidence that the strength of a formerly secure union has been eroded. A signifi-
cant drop in support for the union, whether manifested by a decrease in member-
ship or the advent of significant internal political factions, warrants a softening of
98. Professor Wellington has considered the relationship between judicial scrutiny of traditional con-
tracts and the level of review afforded labor agreements. He identifies the element of the relative ine-
quality of the parties' bargaining power as the factor that may explain the more ready judicial regulation
of traditional contracts. See Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargainng Agreement, 112 U. PA.
L. REV. 467, 494-98 (1964).
99. The notion that consent should be presumed gains some support from the frequently accepted
view that one purpose of the Wagner Act, through its duty to bargain and protection of collective activity,
was to "create aggregations of economic power on the side of employees .... " Cox, The Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1958). Many would assume that this effort was normally suc-
cessful in imbuing the union with the requisite strength to deal effectively with the employer. See Wel-
lington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467, 497 (1964). Thus,
only truly exceptional cases would give rise to concerns as to whether the union's consent satisfied the
minimum level of voluntariness.
100. A similar question is the standard of proof required before a court will disregard an apparent
labor agreement which is alleged to be a sham. See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v.
United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973); Carpenters District Council v. United Contractors
Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir.
1976). In this context, it appears that courts frequently focus on the nature of the relationship between the
employer and the union. A central question is whether the union was improperly dominated by the
employer. See Carpenters District Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d at 121.
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the presumption of consent. Closer attention to these cases will serve as some
check against the employer's using a union's extreme vulnerability to impose terms
which would not otherwise receive approval.1 0'
The above division of cases is made with due regard for developments in the
sports industry. Indeed, the proposal for sensitivity to recently formed collective
bargaining relationships is intended to approve the approach taken in Mackey.
The evidence in that case suggested rather strongly that the bargaining relation-
ship was still very much in its developmental stages and had not matured to the
point that a court could have confidence that all terms had a reasonable prospect
of appearing on the bargaining table.10 2 The court's further inquiry into the
actual bargaining process confirmed that there was no real consent. Other cases
can be read as presenting features which similarly fall within the exception identi-
fied above.1
0 3
Does McCourt represent the first of the sports cases which should have been
treated under the presumption of the consent? There are some objective features
of the relationship which support that conclusion: the parties had been through
several bargaining sessions;' °4 the disputed restraint occupied a prominent posi-
tion in the resulting agreement; 105 the particular form of restraint was not of long
standing;10 6 and unlike some other players' unions, that representing the hockey
players in McCourl appears to have enjoyed good support among its constituency at
the time of the negotiations. 10 7 But the ultimate conclusion on this matter must
remain somewhat in doubt because the record in McCourt was not developed for
the purpose of addressing it. What can be suggested is that while McCourt was
correct to embrace the point made in Mackey that consent was a critical issue, it
does not follow that the McCourt facts required the same sort of detailed inquiry
into what happened at the bargaining table. Unlike Mackey, McCourt did not raise
significant preliminary doubts about the effectiveness of the union's bargaining. It
would have been appropriate for the McCourt court to pause first to ask whether
there were grounds to suspect that the players' apparent consent was not effective.
101. The Executive Director of the NFL Players Association has expressed concern about the availa-
bility of the labor exemption where the union involved is weak or misdirected by its leadership. More
details of Mr. Garvey's views are set out in note 57 supra. He apparently would endorse a legal standard
which encouraged judicial review in every case in which an agreed-upon restraint was contested.
102. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
The district court in Mackey made specific detailed findings indicating the weak bargaining position in
which the NFLPA found itself. See 407 F. Supp. at 1010.
103. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aj'd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
104. Some of the early history of the parties' collective bargaining relationship is documented in Phil-
adelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 481-86 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
105. Compare Mackey v. NFL, 543 F. 2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976) (the most recent collective bar-
gaining agreement failed to mention the restraint in question).
106. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
107. See Letter from S.G. Simpson, NHLPA Director of Operations, to June C. Hubbard (June 18,
1981) (100 percent membership); Sporting News, Sept. 20, 1975, at 47, col. 1. Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1980,
at C19, col. 3 (420 members in NHLPA); Province (Vancouver), Sept. 26, 1978, at 18, col. 3 (NHLPA
upset with McCourt's challenge to section of collective bargaining agreement).
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The analysis suggested above should limit to a few extreme cases the need for a
court to probe beyond a general appraisal of the parties' bargaining relationship.
But even when such a case arises, the court should use care in selecting the evi-
dence upon which it relies. To be avoided are decisions which find their ultimate
support in highly impressionistic appraisals of a distant series of negotiations. On
the other hand, it may be inevitable that there will be cases in which it is necessary
to inquire as to exactly how much a particular issue was discussed and in, what
terms. 18 The credibility of any such investigation will depend upon the availa-
bility of some external evidence which supports the conclusion reached. A system-
atic approach to dealing with conflicting evidence would begin with an appraisal
of the objective evidence and then probe the less reliable data to determine if it
persuasively indicates a contrary view. Weight should be given to the impression-
istic evidence only if its implication is unmistakable. In short, it should be treated
as evidence of a different, and inferior, quality and its use should be circumscribed.
The most important implication in the above analysis goes not to refinements
in the use of evidence, but rather to the limited significance of the cases decided to
date. Cases such as Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Robertson, and Mackey should
not be taken as an authorization for courts to undertake a detailed review of intra-
unit restraints found in collective bargaining agreements. These cases arose only
because the respective collective bargaining relationships were quite new, and thus
there was reason to doubt whether the restraints in question had been affected by
the union's presence. The approach suggested above should operate to preclude
this inquiry once the bargaining relationships have matured. Presumably the
players' union's continued involvement in bargaining, and the parties' movement
through successive agreemehts, will serve as evidence that this has occurred. Thus,
the litigation to date may be largely of historical interest. Those cases that involve
new unions launching new bargaining relationships should not be overread as an
invitation for courts to treat each successive bargaining agreement as the occasion
for a detailed appraisal of the bargaining which preceded it.
II
FURTHER ISSUES IN JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PROCESS
One fundamental premise of the preceding analysis is that courts have limited
authority to review the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.
Federal labor policy accepts that the prevailing principle should be freedom of
contract: the parties can agree to whatever terms they wish, and courts will not
inquire into the wisdom or reasonableness of the bargain struck. This theme
appears repeatedly in the decided cases, and its bases and implications have been
108. There are other contexts in which it becomes important to recreate the parties' negotiations. The
fact that some such inquiries are made is not a justification for sanctioning general inquiries into bar-
gaining history. See note 92 supra. Indeed, even where efforts to recreate negotiations are made at present,
concerns arise for the quality of proof available. See Modjeska, Guess Who's Coming to the Bargaining Table?,
39 OHio ST. L.J. 415, 420-21 (1978).
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the subject of several commentaries. 0 9 The competing policies underlying the
antitrust laws represent an exception to the general policy of judicial restraint, 110
but it has been suggested above that as to contract terms with only intra-unit
effects, the antitrust "exception" is limited to rare cases involving incomplete or
defective bargaining relationships. For most situations, the larger policy of not
second-guessing the parties' agreement will prevail.
While these policies are firmly embedded in the federal labor law, there is
another phase of the player restraint litigation which might invite their evasion.
To date, the potential for conflict between the labor law and class action rules is
only suggested in the cases, and any apparent undermining of federal labor policy
can be explained. The existing precedents are easily misread, however, and it
seems useful to indicate how some of their broader implications should be
confined.
The two noteworthy cases are Robertson v. National Basketball Association, l one
aspect of which was previously discussed,1 1 2 and Alexander v. National Football
League, 1 3 which was an outgrowth of the Mackey case. The Mackey litigation was
begun by'a group of named plaintiffs to attack the player restraints utilized in the
NFL. Following the Eighth Circuit decision in Mackey which found the restraints
to violate the antitrust laws," 4 Alexander was initiated as a class action to seek
damages and other relief for all existing and former NFL players.' 1 5 Both the
Robertson and the Alexander class actions produced settlements. The respective
players' unions were involved in each settlement arrangement. Either as a part of,
or at least concurrent with, the resolution of the class action, a labor agreement
was signed." 6  The respective litigation settlements were later subjected to court
review, as is required by relevant federal procedure. The treatment of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement differed in each review. But the respective courts chose
to evaluate the settlement agreements under the legal standard applied to class
action settlements generally.' 17 Thus, as perceived by Judge Carter in Robertson,
"[t]he function of the court is to canvass the relevant factors necessary to render an
informed judgment as to the fairness, reasonableness, wisdom and adequacy of the
109. See notes 12, 50 supra and accompanying text.
110. See text accompanying notes 12-13, 95-97 supra.
111. 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977) (class action settlement).
112. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text (discussion of preliminary rulings on labor exemp-
tion and substantive antitrust claims).
113. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,730 (D. Minn.), af'd sub nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir.
1978).
114. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
115. In later proceedings, the case became recaptioned as Reynolds v. NFL, reflecting the fact that only
a few class members appealed the district court's decision approving the class action settlement. See 584
F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
116. See In re Robertson Class Plaintiffs, 479 F. Supp. 657, 663-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd in part, reo'din
part, 625 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1980); Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,985; Robertson v. NBA, 72
F.R.D. at 66-67.
117. See generally In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167, 179 (5th Cir. 1979); In re
General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870
(1979); Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797, at 229 (1972); McGough & Lerach, Ternination of Class Actions: The Judicial
Role, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 445, 458 (1972).
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proferred termination of the action."""' Such an exacting standard of review
hardly seems to incorporate the notions of freedom of contract and judicial
restraint which apply under the labor laws.'1 9 Indeed, the courts here thought
themselves empowered to evaluate not only the reasonableness of the settlement,
but also its adequacy. The question to be posed is whether this shift from a stan-
dard of judicial non-intervention to one of direct and detailed judicial review can
be reconciled with the policy of restraint which predominates in the labor area.
The degree of union involvement in the settlement is certainly relevant, as is the
specific nature of the issues which are settled. The cases decided to date do not
deliver clear pronouncements on the larger point, but an analysis of the decisions
does provide the occasion for clarification.
A. First Principles: The Case for Supplanting Class Action Review
There are some situations in which the predominance of labor law policies
ought to be clear. A brief review of a hypothetical case may be useful as a bench-
mark for evaluating the situations which have been litigated. The hypothetical
case had these features: a group of players, with independent counsel and no
obvious connection with the players' union, brings a class action alleging that the
defendant league's player restraints violate the antitrust laws. The restraints in
operation at the time of the litigation were devised by the defendant long before
the union came into being. Further, we will assume that they had never been
treated seriously in collective bargaining. The plaintiff-players seek relief for both
prior injuries and those anticipated in the future. Thus, they seek money damages
and an injunction. Assume further that later, the union and defendant employers
independently enter into a collective bargaining agreement which modifies the
future application of the restraints.
It should be clear that if the collective bargaining satisfies the threshold dis-
cussed in the first part of this paper, neither the class representatives nor their
counsel could object to the terms of that labor contract on nonlabor grounds. The
reason why that objection is removed is analytically significant. In particular, the
union-employer agreement is not to be viewed as a "settlement" of the plaintiffs'
case. Rather, the effect of the agreement is much more basic: it eliminates the
plaintiffs' cause of action as far as prospective violations are concerned. Thus, the
plaintiffs have not "lost control" of their cause of action. Rather, there is no cause
of action for the now-immunized rules on player mobility. The new arrangement
is a labor contract and should be accorded the same deference shown to other
collective bargaining agreements; and the prevailing principle should be one of
judicial restraint. 120
The above analysis has implications for cases in which the union operates in
118. 72 F.R.D. at 68 [emphasis added]. See also Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,992-93.
119. "Within the area in which collective bargaining was required, Congress was not concerned with
the substantive terms upon which the parties agreed. The purposes of the Acts are served by bringing the
parties together and establishing conditions under which they are to work out their agreements themselves
(citations omitted)." Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
120. It can be assumed that in the normal case, Aackey' three criteria for application of the labor
exemption would be met. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra
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closer cooperation with the class representatives. The filing of the class action does
not relieve the union, or the employer, of its duty to bargain about the terms and
conditions of employment. 21 The bargaining relationship continues and presum-
ably could yield an agreement. 122 Where that happens, the agreement is again not
merely a "settlement of the pending litigation." It is, rather, the expected product
of the obligations imposed by the labor laws. Moreover, as suggested, the presence
of a "bona fide, arm's-length" bargain eliminates any cause of action for the period
of the agreement. The class action may continue, of course, but its focus would be
limited to past injuries.
We can thus identify cases in which the labor policy of judicial non-interven-
tion will take precedence over the general procedural rule calling for detailed
review of class actions. But when we turn from the hypothetical situation dis-
cussed above to cases actually litigated, we get a less clear impression of the con-
trolling effect of the labor law. As noted, in each of the player restraint cases
involving a class action settlement-Robertson and Alexander-the court felt author-
ized to inquire into whether at least some features of the agreement were fair,
reasonable, and adequate. At the same time, there was no direct discussion of how
the labor policy of limited reviewability could be reconciled with this approach.
Did the courts mean to suggest that labor law principles were not relevant to the
settlements under review? Any such implication was probably not intended. But
the explanation for the result in each of the cases differs, and it is appropriate to
review them separately.
B. The Robertson Settlement
The agreement that terminated the Robertson class action included a provision
for the payment of substantial damages by the defendant NBA clubs.123 Presum-
ably these damages were to compensate the members of the plaintiff class for inju-
ries allegedly resulting from the league's prior imposition of the restraints. But
apart from the damages provision, the settlement had significant impact on the
terms and conditions of the players' subsequent employment in the NBA. The
settlement called for a continuation of a college draft and an arrangement for
compensating clubs that lost players through free agency. 124  As would be
expected, a settlement of this sort was not undertaken without the involvement of
121. One complaint raised by NFL owners following the expiration of the 1970 collective bargaining
agreement was that they were required to deal with the player restraint issues on two fronts: in court in the
Macky proceedings and at the collective bargaining table. See Oversight Heanngs on National Football League
Labor-Management Dispute.- Heanngs Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 51-55 (1975).
122. A collective bargaining agreement absent settlement of the class action is probably more theoret-
ical than real. Each settlement will represent some cost to management, which is likely to desire that the
overall cost be settled in a single undertaking. Similarly the union is likely to have an interest in keeping
employer resources from being depleted by a settlement over which it has no control. See text accompa-
nying notes 174-176 infra.
123. See 72 F.R.D. at 69.
124. Details of the compensation arrangement, and some of the controversy that surrounded it, are
considered in later proceedings in the Robertson class action. See In re Robertson Class Plaintiffs, 479 F.
Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afdinpart, rev'd in part, 625 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1980) (Marvin Webster compen-
sation dispute). After the 1980-81 season, the NBA's system for compensating teams that lost free agents
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the union which represented the league's active players and which, of course, had a
legal duty to represent their interests in collective bargaining. In addition to class
counsel and counsel for the league, the discussions leading to the agreement
included representatives of the players' union. 125 Moreover, apart from the settle-
ment agreement in the class action, the league and the union entered into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.126 As to matters covered by the settlement agreement,
the collective bargaining agreement does not differ and the two arrangements were
rather precisely coordinated.
For the future, then, the settlement agreement has essentially the same effect on
the players as would a collective bargaining arrangement entered into in the
absence of litigation. 12 7 However, the settlement agreement has hardly operated
like a labor contract as far as judicial intervention into its implementation is con-
cerned. As previously indicated, there was an initial inquiry by the district court
into the reasonableness, wisdom, and fairness of the new arrangement. The court's
evaluation was fully approved on appeal without suggestion that labor law policies
required a different approach. 12  Still later there was another round of litiga-
tion-the now famous Marvin Webster compensation controversy-which found
the district court involving itself in rather minute details of the industry's opera-
tion. 129 In the Webster matter, for example, the trial court appraised whether the
value of Rick Barry to his San Francisco team was greater or less than the value of
Marvin Webster to the Seattle SuperSonics. 130 While this question was relevant to
the operation of the NBA's free agent compensation arrangement, the particular
dispute represented the type of matter that is normally well-removed from judicial
purview in the labor area. 131 In neither the original proceeding reviewing the class
action settlement nor in the subsequent Webster compensation litigation is there a
discussion of how labor law concepts might have affected the analysis. In each
proceeding, both the district court and the court of appeals assumed that the
details of the settlement were proper matters for judicial scrutiny.
What is the explanation for this extensive judicial oversight? The most imme-
diate explanation is that the court's detailed review was appropriate because the
interested parties, including the union, had authorized it. This consent was critical
expired and was replaced by an arrangement under which the original employer had a right of first refusal
based on the contract offered by the player's new club. See New York Times, May 19, 1981, at 20, col. 5.
125. See 72 F.R.D. at 66-67.
126. See Globe & Mail (Toronto), April 13, 1976, at S2, col. 1 (NBA and NBA Players Ass'n reach 3
year collective bargaining agreement); Washington Post, Aug. 3, 1976, at D2, col. 3 (U.S. District Judge
Carter approves collective bargaining agreement between NBA and NBA Players Ass'n).
127. The agreement fulfilled the important function of setting the terms of the players' employment
for the future. See In re Robertson Class Plaintiffs, 479 F. Supp. 657, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afdipart, rev'd
,n part, 625 F. 2d 407 (2d Cir. 1980).
128. See 556 F.2d at 686-87.
129. In re Robertson Class Plaintiffs, 479 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aJ'd in part, rev'd npart, 625
F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1980).
130. Id at 663.
131. Seegenerally United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 540-74, 584-603 (1976); St. Antoinejudica/ Review of Labor Arbitration Awards. A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
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at the two stages of the proceedings mentioned above: when the class action settle-
ment was initially reviewed and later, when the new compensation agreement was
implemented. On the latter point, the judicial disposition of the Webster compen-
sation controversy illustrates the extent to which the union and the league had
involved the agreement in the normal judicial processes.
The parties specifically chose to commit the interpretation of their new
arrangement to a district court special master rather than rely on the more tradi-
tional device of private arbitration. 132 Moreover, the agreement expressly recog-
nized the authority of the district court to review decisions of the special master
and specified the standards for the court's review. 133 The litigation which resulted
from the Webster compensation controversy focused on the question of how closely
the special master and the court could scrutinize initial compensation decisions
made by the NBA Commissioner. Both the district court and the court of appeals
agreed that the special master was not bound by the Commissioner's orders on
compensation. 34 Intervention by the special master was thought to be appropriate
even when there was something less than an abuse of discretion by the Commis-
sioner. Moreover, it was accepted that the district court had some limited
authority to review the special master's findings.
In the course of the appeal of the Webster matter, the NBA made the argu-
ment that judicial review of the Commissioner's decisions on compensation should
be limited because the judicial institutions lacked expertise in the difficult matter
of evaluating a player's worth. 135 Although not framed as an argument for appli-
cation of the labor law policy of restraint, the league's contention sought to invoke
a premise-the limited expertise of the courts-which was one consideration
prompting judicial restraint in the review of other labor agreements. 136 The court
of appeals' response to this argument underscores the unusual nature of the Rob-
ertson settlement. The court observed:
We would not have been in the least displeased if the parties to the antitrust suit had settled
their differences on a basis that kept the amount of compensation awards completely
immune from judicial scrutiny. But they did not. Instead, the NBA, which now so ear-
nestly urges the court to stay out of the matter, decided to avoid the risk of antitrust lia-
bility adjudication by giving the court explicit authority to enforce an agreement that
contains a significant substantive limit on compensation awards. It was open to the NBA to
bargain for an interim compensation rule whereby the award of the Commissioner was final
not only between the teams, . . . but also between the NBA and the players. Having
imposed upon the courts the obligation to enforce the terms of the agreement,. . . the NBA
is in no position to complain when the court decides the matter that was entrusted to it. 137
Thus, it appears that the provision for continuing judicial oversight of the new
employment arrangement was not mandatory, and a union or employer involved
in a subsequent settlement would be free to follow a course which took full advan-
tage of the labor laws' preference for limited judicial review.
132. See 479 F. Supp. at 660.
133. See id at 665-66.
134. See id at 668-70; 625 F.2d at 412.
135. 625 F.2d at 414.
136. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
137. 625 F.2d at 414.
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Why did the.parties in Robertson not explore that course? Why did they not
resist having the new agreement tested under the more exacting standards for class
action settlements? The best explanation is probably found in the incomplete
development of the labor exemption at the time of the Robertson settlement. The
initial agreement was reached in February 1976.138 At that time, it looked
extremely doubtful that antitrust immunity would attach to player restraints even
if they were the product of bargaining. The most pertinent "law" on the availa-
bility of antitrust immunity consisted of several district court decisions, and none
of these were encouraging for an employer's claim of immunity. The trial court
decision in Macke, for example, suggested that immunity could be claimed only
by employees, that the restraints were not mandatory subjects of collective bar-
gaining, and that any agreement on the restraints would be an illegal subject of
bargaining. 139 And, of course, the settlement was surely influenced by Judge
Carter's prior pronouncements in Robertson itself. Especially noteworthy is the
court's suggestion, discussed earlier, that the labor exemption only extends to mat-
ters clearly in the self-interest of employees.14° In short, the definition of the labor
exemption had not yet been subject to the clarifying influence of either the Eighth
Circuit's modification of the initial Macke opinion or the Sixth Circuit's pro-
nouncements in McCourt.
Given this state of relevant precedent, it is understandable that the labor par-
ticipants in the settlement would accept a compromise which looked like a tradi-
tional litigation settlement, with continued judicial oversight, rather than a more
private, more insular labor disposition. Any suggestion by management, or labor,
that the new employment terms ought to be viewed as part of a collective bar-
gaining agreement would have been met with the response that such treatment
would afford no special status. Protection against further antitrust problems could
be assured only if the new restraints were part of a settlement of the antitrust
litigation. Such a settlement would seemingly require a substantial involvement
by the court entertaining the claims. Hence, a settlement like that in Robertson was
predictable.
This explanation should serve to identify why the Robertson settlement is not a
particularly useful model for the future. It is now clearer that a compromise
reached in collective bargaining preempts claims for prospective relief in the anti-
trust action. The parties thus need not feel themselves limited to the mechanism of
ongoing judicial supervision selected in Robertson. Indeed if the pronouncements in
at least three federal appeals court decisions are to be given weight, the preferred
context for settling controversies about restraints is the collective bargaining pro-
cess.' 4 1 Thus, if in the future the union and management were to assert greater
138. 72 F.R.D. at 66.
139. See 407 F. Supp. at 1008-09. No greater encouragement was offered by earlier decisions in Kapp
v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) and Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
140. See 389 F. Supp. at 888-89, 895. See also text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
141. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 289 (8th Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th
Cir. 1976); Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615, 632
(8th Cir. 1976).
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independence from judicial control, the new approach would proceed with the
blessing of the more recent decisions.
C. The Alexander Settlement
By the time of the settlement of the Alexander class action, 42 the immunizing
effect of good faith collective bargaining had been established. It is understand-
able then that both the parties and the courts made a greater effort to treat the
labor and class action aspects of the case as more distinct than they had been in
Robertson. There was, for example, a separately denominated collective bargaining
agreement which set forth the new rules to govern player movement within the
league. 143 The main focus of the class action settlement, on the other hand, was on
setting monetary damages for prior injuries and to prescribe the formula for dis-
tributing these among class members. There was also a technical difference
between the identity of the parties to the two agreements. The settlement was
between the individual former and active players who comprised the plaintiff class
and the league and clubs who were the defendants in that proceeding. 44 The
collective bargaining agreement, on the other hand, was between the players'
union (NFLPA) and the NFL clubs.
Despite the presence of some distinctive features of the two agreements, the
question of their true relationship was the source of some confusion in the proceed-
ings to review the settlement. This lack of certainty in characterization was
affected in no small measure by the fact that the two agreements were negotiated
simultaneously. Moreover, while the class plaintiffs and the players' union had
different lawyers representing them, the individuals involved were members of the
same firm.' 45 Finally, the settlement agreement included important links with the
labor contracts, including a covenant by class plaintiffs not to sue over the new
player mobility rules found in the collective bargaining agreement.
1 46
The uncertainty in the relationship between the two agreements ultimately led
to a lack of precision in the review undertaken by the court. The imprecision is
most evident in the district court opinion. It appears that the court would have
liked to have been able to say that only the settlement agreement was before it;
that the agreement dealt only with monetary relief for past injuries; and that since
this was merely the settlement of a class action damage claim, the appropriate
standard of review was whether the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable
to class members. Much of the court's opinion is devoted to appraising these ele-
ments and reaching the conclusion that they are satisfied. Ultimately, however,
the court cannot separate the collective bargaining agreement completely. Fifteen
class members objected to the disposition of the original case. Most of these objec-
tions concerned the new player restraints found in the labor contract. In the words
142. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,730 (D. Minn.).
143. See id at 72,985, 72,997.
144. Id at 72,984, 72,989.
145. See id at 73,002. Cf Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720, 731-32 (M.D. Fla.
1970), af'dper curzam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (no conflict found where same counsel represented both
class plaintiffs and union).
146. See 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,997.
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of District Court Judge Larson, "Once the objectors . . . had their collective foot
in the door, the Court found it impossible to hold back the flood of evidence
sought to be introduced on the propriety of the new Bargaining Agreement."' 47 I
The district court is never quite clear as to exactly why the collective bar-
gaining agreement was considered, a point which would seem to bear on the selec-
tion of the proper standard of review. In one passage the court states expressly
that it does not view the collective bargaining agreement as part of the considera-
tion for the settlement agreement. 148 Yet, later in the opinion, the court suggests
just the opposite. The court states that "the defendants were compelled to deal
simultaneously with the NFL players' union and class counsel in attempting to
resolve the issues posed by the Alexander case and in the collective bargaining nego-
tiations .... "149 In the court's view, "no method existed for negotiating unre-
lated settlements on these issues." 150 A further basis for doubting the court's initial
conclusion that the collective bargaining agreement was not part of the considera-
tion for the settlement agreement is the actual language used in the paragraph of
the document which memorialized the settlement. That provision, which was not
mentioned by the court, recites:
In consideration of the promises of the respective parties hereto as set forth herein, members of the
Plaintiff class shall be entitled to receive the full and complete benejils and privileges of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement on the terms and subject to the conditions therein set forth and shall in
addition be entitled to receive a distribution from the $13,675,000 in settlement monies
151
The elements of the parties' exchange seem rather unmistakable in this passage.
At a minimum, the language counsels against any judicial effort to place the two
agreements in categories which are wholly distinct.
The district court ultimately found a link between the two, but, interestingly,
this is founded in a provision of the settlement agreement other than that which
recites the consideration. In the court's view, the collective bargaining agreement
may be "implicated in the settlement" by virtue of a covenant under which plain-
tiffs agree not to sue to contest a range of provisions including the standard con-
tract, the draft system, the waiver system, compensation rules, and, in general, the
NFL Constitution and By-Laws. 152  Since the covenant extended to player
147. Id at 72,997.
148. Id
149. Id at 73,001.
150. Id
151. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement 6, Alexander v. National Football League, 4-76 Civ.
123, at 70a (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 1977) [emphasis added].
152. 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,997. The covenant not to sue provided:
Upon issuance of a final Court Order in this action certifying the Plaintiff Class as described in the
preceding paragraph 3 as a Rule 23(b)(1) class and approving the settlement of this action on the
terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement, the NFLPA, the Plaintiffs, and the
members of Plaintiff Class each hereby covenant not to sue, nor support financially or administra-
tively, any suit against the NFL or any club or against the Management Council with respect to any
claim relating to any aspect of the NFL rules, including without limitation, the Standard Player Con-
tract, the NFL Contract, the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, the college draft, the option clause, the
right of first refusal or compensation, the "Rozelle Rule," the waiver system, the trading of players,
tampering and the maintenance of certain reserve lists, all in the form in which they have been modi-
fied or agreed to in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or in any other form in which they may have
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restraints in the labor contract, the court thought some review was necessary.
The district court proceeded to consider in some depth the new player restraint
rules found in the collective bargaining agreement. The court detailed various
aspects of the draft, standard player contract, tampering rule and compensation
rule. In addition, the extent of the parties' bargaining, and their good faith in the
negotiations, received attention. The district court opinion does not state clearly
the legal standard that was applied to the agreement. At times it appears that the
court is asking whether the new terms were illegal, since the court cites precedent
to the effect that class action settlements should not be approved if they involve
illegalities.1 5 3 At other times, the court appears to be applying the standard for
antitrust immunity announced in Alackey-that is, whether the new rules were the
product of serious arm's-length collective bargaining.1 5 4 In general, though, it
appears that the district court reviewed the collective bargaining agreement under
the general standards of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy which it believed
must be applied to all class action settlements. 55 Indeed, the inquiry takes the
district court into the minutia of the agreement and the quality of the bargaining
which preceded it. As suggested, the labor law authority for this sort of detailed
review is not apparent, and the precedents that do exist would seem to foreclose
it. 156
When the Alexander case went to the Eighth Circuit, it appeared as Reynolds .
National Football League ' 5 7 reflecting the fact that only Reynolds and a few others of
the class plaintiffs chose to contest the district court's approval of the settlement
agreement. The Eighth Circuit's opinion shares some of the equivocation found in
Judge Larson's decision. Early in the opinion, the appellate court seems to have
an unmistakable notion of how the labor contract and the settlement agreement
are related: "the evidence fully supports the District Court's conclusion that the
collective bargaining agreement was not part of the consideration for the class
existed at any time, or from time to time, during the 1972 season to and including the date of final
Court approval of this Settlement Agreement; provided, however, that nothing contained in this para-
graph 5 or in Section 2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement will prevent the NFLPA or any player
from asserting that any club, acting individually or in concert with other clubs, or the Management
Council has breached the terms of this Settlement Agreement, or of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, the Standard Player Contract, the NFL Player Contract or the NFL Constitution and By-Laws,
and from processing such asserted Breach as a non-injury grievance under the procedures set forth in
Article VII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement; and providedfurther that such covenant not to sue
shall not foreclose any member of the Plaintiff Class who has duly commenced an individual action,
other than the actions referred to herein, in any Federal or State Court, prior to the date of the
execution of this Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, from pursuing such action to its lawful con-
clusion through trial and appeal.
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement T 5, Alexander v. National Football League, 4-76 Civ. 123, at 6 9 a-
70a (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 1977).
153. 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,999 (citing Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975)); In re Clark Oil & Refining Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 422
F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Robertson v. NBA, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aifid, 556 F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1977).
154. See 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 73,000-01.
155. See id at 72,997-73,002. The court set out in detail its view of the criteria relevant to the evalua-
tion of the class action settlement. See id at 72,992-93.
156. See notes 11-13, 50, 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
157. 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
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action settlement . . . ."1 In the court's view, this serves to limit the controversy
before it: "Thus the inquiry to be made by the district court in reviewing the
proposed settlement and by this court in reviewing the district court's approval of
that settlement is limited to the settlement itself rather than the labor agreement
contained in the collective bargaining document."'1 59 Later, however, the court
presents a somewhat different view of the relationship between the two agree-
ments. The court observes that "[a]lthough the collective bargaining agreement
was negotiated contemporaneously with the settlement of this class action, it was
not before the district court except as a circumstance bearing on the farmess of the settle-
ment and the advisability of injunctive relief."' 16 The exception here is susceptible
to a very expansive reading. If the labor contract can affect the fairness of the
settlement, and if it is theoretically possible that the approval of the settlement
could be withheld because of overly harsh labor terms, the two hardly seem unre-
lated, as the court had initially suggested. Moreover, this statement by the court
seems to undermine its earlier appraisal that the district court's review did not
extend to the collective agreement.
This suggestion of a substantive link between the two is out of harmony with
the general theme of the appellate opinion. Other portions of the opinion are
consistent with the court's initial appraisal that it did not regard its review as
necessitating consideration of the collective bargaining agreement. For example,
the appellate court dealt with Judge Carter's view that the covenant not to sue
linked the two agreements and required a review of the labor contract. The
reviewing court specifically declined to make a similar appraisal. The court indi-
cated that "[w]hile the District Court findings on this matter seem amply sup-
ported by the evidence, it is not necessary for us to add any stamp of approval or
disapproval to the collective bargaining agreement.' 6' Thus, apart from the
later intimation that the fairness of the settlement was linked to the labor contract,
the appellate court was rather vigorous in attempting to put distance between the
collective bargaining agreement and the particular proceedings before it.
There is no real reason to quibble with the result reached in Reynolds. It can be
suggested, however, that the persuasive value of the decision is diminished by the
court's failure to develop a coherent theory as to why the collective agreement was
beyond its review. While the court states several times that a detailed appraisal of
the labor contract is not required, the only rationale offered is the shaky premise
that the labor contract was not part of the consideration for settlement. Given the
fact that the settlement itself identified the collective bargaining agreement as part
of its consideration, 62 that the two were negotiated together, 163 and that the
plaintiff class enjoyed a close, nonadversarial relationship with the union, 164 the
validity of this assessment is not self-evident.
158. Id at 282.
159. Id
160. Id at 288 [emphasis added].
161. Id
162. See text at note 151 supra
163. See 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,984 n.2.
164. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
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The guidance provided by Reynolds would have been much clearer if the court
had treated the lack of review of the labor contract as less discretionary. The court
should have suggested that the judicial appraisal was foreclosed by relevant labor
precedents. Such review would have been precluded in the absence of a pending
class action. Since, as noted, the class' cause of action cannot encompass prospec-
tive injuries based on rules settled by robust collective bargaining,' 6 5 the presence
of litigation on other matters should not change the result. Even if the negotia-
tions for the settlement include a collective bargaining settlement, it does not
follow that all aspects of the settlement are equally open to court review.' 66 One
rather clear implication of this approach is that the district court's detailed review
of the labor contract was not merely unnecessary, as the appellate court suggests,
but, in fact, inappropriate. While it is true that the covenant not to compete pro-
vides a link between the two agreements, this connection does not require review of
each component. The covenant simply presents a variation of the point made
earlier: in every practical sense, the two agreements were connected. They did,
however, have different legal status; there are particularized federal policies that
prohibit the application of a fine-mesh standard of review to one of them. The fact
that the plaintiff class promises not to sue over matters in the collective bargaining
terms does not appear to present a sufficient reason for abandoning those sound
labor policies. Such a promise is no more than an indication that the plaintiffs
recognized that the negotiations which preceded the settlement had dual charac-
teristics. Under this view, the substantive effect of the labor agreement does not
change.
III
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ROBERTSON AND ALEXAANDER/REYNOLDS
Neither Robertson nor Alexander/Reynolds provides the most severe test for
accommodating the different rules that define the respective reviewability of labor
contracts and class action settlements. In each case, there was a high degree of
cooperation, if not virtual identity of interest, between the players' union on the
one hand and the plaintiff class representatives and their counsel on the other.
6 7
Thus, there was no real competition between the two groups for the right to settle
the various aspects of litigation. 6 Also, the presentation of the issue of the nature
of the court's review was largely the product of the parties' consent. As noted in
Robertson, the union and management appear to have agreed to a fully particular-
165. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
166. Few cases explore this issue. There has, however, been a recognition that labor law principles
will operate to modify the normal operation of rules on class actions. See In re Clark Oil & Refining Corp.
Antitrust Litigation, 422 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Cf Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co.,
318 F. Supp. 720, 731-32 (M.D. Fla. 1970), affdper curtam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (collective bar-
gaining agreement approved as part of class settlement, even though some class members objected to the
agreement).
167. See text accompanying notes 125-26, 145 supra.
168. Compare Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720, 731 (M.D. Fla. 1970), afdper
curtam, 441 F. 2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (settlement initially negotiated without objection by class representa-
tive or union, but objection raised later).
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ized review of the new employment conditions. In Alexander/Rnolds, the areas
offered for court review were not as extensive, but, again, it appears that there was
no fundamental adversity between class counsel and the union on the issue of the
reviewability of the collective bargaining agreement.
Such compatibility is not inevitable. An action such as Alexander could be
brought by representatives less sympathetic to the union's position. Indeed, in ret-
rospect it seems likely that the objectors in Alexander would have fared better in
having their positions considered if they had initiated the class action. Any such
proceeding that involves more distance between the representatives of the class
and the union is likely to necessitate more careful consideration of the conflicting
policies of reviewability.
One situation which might arise has already been discussed. If the union
secures an agreement on future employment terms independent of the class action,
this agreement should control any prospective class action remedies. As suggested
earlier, if the threshold for effective union consent has been reached, the labor
agreement should have the effect of extinguishing the class' claims concerning
future injuries. 
169
An employer group that is also a defendant in a class action may not be anx-
ious to negotiate separately with a union and with class action representatives.
Could the employer-defendants insist that the union participate in joint bar-
gaining with class representatives? Existing labor doctrine appears not to give the
employer any such leverage. The labor statutes impose an affirmative duty on the
employer to bargain with the union about the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 17 0 Neither the statute nor the case law suggests that this duty is qualified if
the employer is involved in litigation with some portion of the employee group.
1 7
It should not be startling to find that the employer owes legal duties to his
employees which arise from different sources and that these may become action-
able simultaneously. Moreover, our prior assumptions structure the issue so that
the two groups--class representatives and union-will be negotiating about dif-
frent matters. The former seeks settlement for past injuries while the latter pursues
changes which are prospective.
A somewhat different set of issues would be raised by the case in which the
object of the union's efforts is not to compel separate collective bargaining, but
rather to insert itself more directly into the prosecution of the class action. Indeed,
the union might go so far as to demand either that it be substituted as class repre-
sentative or that its attorney be substituted as counsel for the class. 172 The basic
question which is raised in these maneuvers concerns the right of the union to limit
169. See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra.
170. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976); R. GORMAN, BASIc
TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLErCTIVE BARGAINING 506-09 (1976).
171. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
172. See general'y 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1765-69,
1794 (1972); Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Actioas Under Federal
Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217 (1975). The union might also seek to enter the litigation as an intervenor.
See, e.g., Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aJ'd, per cun n, 441
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the representation of employee interests by others.1 73
The union has available a number of arguments which suggest that it is a more
appropriate representative than one which lacks the capacity to bargain collec-
tively. One important contention is premised on what can be characterized as the
"one-pie theory." All important concessions by the employers can likely be trans-
lated into the economic costs that they represent for the leagues. For a monetary
settlement, the translation can be made readily. But, it would be urged, significant
modification of player restraints also has economic costs.1 74 If players move more
freely, the employers' expenditures for salaries are likely to go up. t 75 Relatedly,
increased freedom of movement will reduce the value of the club's ability to
market its reserve or option rights in its players. The essence of the one-pie theory
is that there is only a single economic pool out of which the players' litigation and
bargaining claims against the restraints can be satisfied. The union has the right
to bargain for a share of this pie because of its status as the exclusive representative
for collective bargaining purposes. The union may object, however, that its ability
to fulfill its statutory duty could be seriously undermined if another employee rep-
resentative also had a right to assert claims against the same asset pool.' 76 A large,
overly generous monetary settlement to the class representative might seriously
limit the type of agreement on new player restraints that the union could secure.
To avoid this unnecessary, and perhaps disadvantageous, competition for the lim-
ited settlement pool, the union would urge that it should be accepted as the exclu-
sive representative of the plaintiff class.
Implicit in this argument is a theme which has been given recognition in gen-
eral class action litigation involving objections to the self-appointed class represen-
tative. Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a class
action can be maintained only if "the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class."1 77 Interpretations of this section make
clear that the issue of class representation touches on both the nature of the
interest of the named representatives and the quality of class counsel. Among the
objections which will be entertained by a court is the contention that the interests
of the representatives or their counsel are not coextensive with the interests of the
173. Somewhat related issues arise when a union seeks to prosecute employment discrimination claims
on behalf of its members. See, e.g., Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines,
Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Deinhardt, Unions as Title VII Plaintiff
Class Representatives: A Potential Conftict of Roles and a Possible Solution, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 755 (1977).
174. See generaly H. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS (1973); Canes, The
Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 81-113 (R. Noll
ed. 1974); Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' Labor Market, 64 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 242 (1956).
175. Several sources have documented the effects of increased player mobility on player salaries. See,
e.g., Kaplan, Is There a Ceiling?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1981, at 35-38; New York Times, Mar. 16,
1981, at Cl, col. 1.
176. One court that has allowed individual players to assert collective employee claims has suggested
that such relief is appropriate "where from disloyalty, corruption, or other influences the Union has failed
in its duty of faithful representation." Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 416 F.2d 1169, 1178 (5th Cir.
1969). While the quoted language might be read as a limitation on the right of employees to bring class
actions, such a limitation was apparently not intended. See Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 441
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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class.'1 7  Such a lack of cohesion may be found where the representatives have
rights different from those of some class members, or where the representatives are
likely to seek remedies which would not be desired by others in the class. t 79 The
players' union contesting independent representation of the employee class would
seem to have. a colorable objection based on these principles. The independent
representative lacks ultimate authority to deal with all aspects of the employees'
complaints. The matter of settling future terms of employment has been reserved
to the players' union and as just suggested, it can preempt any negotiations which
the representative might undertake independently. Thus, it appears that the focus
of the independent representative's efforts must be limited to monetary settlements
for past injuries. But a settlement of this sort may not be wholly satisfactory to all
class members. Some may, for example, desire a more complete resolution that
treats both past injuries and future effects. As mentioned, an overly generous mon-
etary settlement may limit the members' ability to secure the most desirable
arrangements for future mobility. Moreover, the choice between the potential rep-
resentatives is not an even one. Only the union has the capacity to act on the
employer's behalf for all aspects of their complaints. It has ultimate authority to
set future terms of employment, and it is not disqualified to raise claims for past
injuries. The independent representative, however, lacks authority to set new work
rules when the union is present. Thus, there appears to be a legitimate concern
about whether its interest is coextensive with the player concerns that might
exist. 180
Does this mean that the union should always have the option of supplanting an
independent class representative? The response must be negative because the
selection of the representative is not a matter that can be treated in a categorical
rule. t"' The ultimate question is whether the class representation will be fair and
adequate. This determination is highly contextual and particular cases may turn
on facts wholly peculiar to their setting. The nature of the legal claim, the likeli-
hood of a replication, the union's involvement in setting the rules being litigated,
the presence of factions within the union, and even the competency of the union's
attorney are matters relevant to the court's approval or disapproval of the existing
representative. 182 What can be suggested, though, is that a union's request to con-
178. See generaly Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968); Advertising Spe-
cialty Nat'l Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 238 F.2d 108, 119-20 (1st Cir. 1956); 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1768-9 (1972).
179. See, e.g., Mixon v. Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 413 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (plaintiff's estate
could not represent class employment discrimination suit because of lack of interest in prospective reme-
dies); See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768 (1972).
180. The class may include former employees, persons who are not presently part of the bargaining
unit. Although bargaining for them is not mandatory, it is not precluded, and the union may properly seek
employer consent to deal with the claims of retirees. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 176-79 (1971); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 528-29 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1177-80 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
182. Compare Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1977) (union approved as class
representative) with Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Asss'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490
F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (union found not to be adequate representative).
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trol the class litigation is not to be lightly dismissed, and general class action prece-
dents would seem to offer encouragement to the union concerned about losing
control of important employee-related litigation.
IV
CONCLUSION
This paper has considered two matters which, on the surface at least, appear to
be quite distinct. One concerns the threshold for employer invocation of the pro-
tection of labor's antitrust exemption where labor market restraints are involved.
The other involves the relationship between class action settlements and collective
bargaining. An implication of this paper is that there is, in fact, a significant
common thread that joins these issues. Specifically, each topic raises a variation of
the basic question of the extent to which courts ought to intervene to evaluate the
substantive and procedural aspects of traditional collective bargaining.
A major premise of this paper has been that sound labor policy counsels in
favor of minimal judicial involvement in appraising the reasonableness of collec-
tive agreements. A good deal of authority, from the Supreme Court and else-
where, seems to accept this assessment. It is not suggested, of course, that the
preference for judicial non-intervention is without exception. As the player
restraint/labor exemption cases have made clear, a blind adherence to the policy
would protect wholly unilateral employer action and subvert the goal of the labor
exemption to encourage employees to define their own self-interest. 8 3 The recent
sports industry litigation has served to reaffirm the need for rethinking how labor,
antitrust, and class action policies will be accommodated at their margins.
The prior discussion has attempted to suggest that the recent judicial consider-
ations of these issues have not always produced clear definitions of the respective
roles of the competing policies. Perhaps understandably, there has been a tendency
to view the problems apart from their general labor context with undue deference
to general class action principles and, in the labor exemption area, a standard of
review which has its origins in earlier dicta. The suggestion made here is that the
results achieved in these areas are likely to be more satisfactory if there is explicit
respect for the autonomy of the collective bargaining process. This policy of not
requiring governmental approval of labor contracts has worked well in other con-
texts. Antitrust and class action concerns may require some adjustments. But
these should be regarded as true exceptions warranting narrow definitions. What
both the antitrust and class action sports cases seem to reveal is that where there is
an agreement which is clearly the product of a robust labor-management give and
take, little is to be gained by upsetting it. It is likely that the courts would do no
better at structuring the "right" accommodation of competing interests. The
courts to date have generally achieved this result, but under standards and doc-
trines which are sometimes troublesome in their future implications and sometimes
unpersuasive. A clearer, less equivocal embrace of the notion that the labor agree-
ment is predominant seems to provide a preferable guide for the future.
183. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
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